The Hilbert Edition: What is it and what is it good for? by Majer, Ulrich
 Philosophia Scientiæ
Travaux d'histoire et de philosophie des sciences 
14-1 | 2010
Varia
The Hilbert Edition: What is it and what is it good
for?
Ulrich Majer
Electronic version
URL: http://journals.openedition.org/philosophiascientiae/138
DOI: 10.4000/philosophiascientiae.138
ISSN: 1775-4283
Publisher
Éditions Kimé
Printed version
Date of publication: 1 April 2010
Number of pages: 141-152
ISBN: 978-2-84174-521-0
ISSN: 1281-2463
 
Electronic reference
Ulrich Majer, « The Hilbert Edition: What is it and what is it good for? », Philosophia Scientiæ [Online],
14-1 | 2010, Online since 01 April 2013, connection on 30 April 2019. URL : http://
journals.openedition.org/philosophiascientiae/138  ; DOI : 10.4000/philosophiascientiae.138 
Tous droits réservés
The Hilbert Edition:
What is it and what is it good for?
Ulrich Majer*
Göttingen Universität
Résumé : Le Mathematical Institute (MI) de l’université de Göttingen et
la Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek (SUB) possèdent en-
semble une impressionnante collection de documents de David Hilbert, qui est
peut-être le mathématicien le plus important de la période 1885-1930, un spé-
cialiste notable de physique mathématique. Ce fonds sera appelé ici le Nachlaß
de Hilbert en un sens étendu. Outre des lettres et bien d’autres documents,
le Nachlaß contient une grande collection d’autographes et de textes dactylo-
graphiés de conférences données par Hilbert tout au long de sa carrière. Les
manuscrits des conférences portant sur les fondements des mathématiques et
des sciences de la nature forment la base d’une édition (à laquelle nous référons
comme l’« Édition Hilbert ») en six volumes : un volume sur les fondements
de la géométrie (Vol. 1), deux sur les fondements de la logique et de l’arith-
métique (Vol. 2, 3), deux sur les fondements de la physique (Vol. 4, 5), et un
volume de sélections des carnets et d’exposés plus généraux de Hilbert. L’Édi-
tion contiendra en grande partie des documents inédits, quoique s’y ajoutent
par endroits les publications centrales des champs concernés. En publiant ces
documents, nous espérons promouvoir une vision renouvelée et plus complète
des réalisations scientifiques de Hilbert, comme de son point de vue philoso-
phique. L’article discute les objectifs scientifiques de l’Édition Hilbert, et les
critères de sélection ayant présidé au choix des documents.
Abstract: The Mathematical Institute (MI) of the University of Göttingen
and the Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek (SUB) together
possess an impressive collection of documents by David Hilbert, perhaps the
most important mathematicians of the period 1885-1930, and a very significant
mathematical physicist. These holdings will be called here the Nachlaß of
D. Hilbert in an extended sense. Besides letters and many other documents,
the Nachlaß contains a vast collection of autographs and typescripts of lectures
held by Hilbert across his whole career. The lecture manuscripts concerned
with the foundation of mathematics and natural science form the basis of an
Edition (henceforth referred to as the “Hilbert Edition”) in six volumes, one
*. I would like to thank one of my fellow General Editors, Michael Hallett, for his
comments, and for helping to put what follows into less stilted English. Nevertheless,
as I make clear below, the views represented in this essay are my own.
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volume on the foundations of geometry (Vol. 1), two on he foundations of logic
and arithmetic (Vols. 2, 3), two on the foundations of physics (Vols. 4, 5) and
one volume, containing selections from Hilbert’s Notebooks and more general
lectures. The Edition will contain largely material previously unpublished,
although this is supplemented in a few places by central publications in the
respective field. By publishing this material, we hope to foster a new and
more complete view of Hilbert’s scientific achievements and his philosophical
viewpoint. The following paper discusses the scientific aims of the Hilbert
Edition, and the selection criteria for the inclusion of documents in it.
***
Let me begin with a somewhat provocative remark:
The edition of the Nachlaß of a scientific author is not a goal in
itself, but only a means to an end in achieving a certain goal or
collection of goals.
The question consequently is: What was our2 goal in deciding to publish a
significant part of David Hilbert’s Nachlaß? In answering this question, I will
draw on the many discussions conducted in the formative stages of the project,
i.e., before the Hilbert Edition properly speaking was underway, as well as
discussions held during the Edition’s subsequent evolution. Let me stress at
the outset, however, that what is presented here is the author’s point of view,
and does not necessarily reflect that of the other editors. Two meta-remarks
are necessary to prevent obvious misunderstanding of the initial remark above.
First, note that reference was made quite consciously to the Nachlaß of
a scientific author, as opposed to the papers and documents of an important
literary figure, for example those of a novelist or poet; matters may be very
different in cases such as these.3 In case of a poet, for example, it may be a
goal in itself to publish the Nachlaß, in particular if the author did not have
the chance to publish in his lifetime everything he wished to see published,
or if there are, say, important works in an incomplete state. But, generally
speaking, things are somewhat different where a scientific author is concerned.
Normally, a scientific author does during his career publish what he wants
to be published, or more precisely, what the scientific community of his time
regards as valuable or worthwhile to have published. The rest is kept in a
2. By “our” goal, I mean primarily the goal of the four General Editors, who
began the project nearly twenty years ago, though this goal is also shared by all the
other editorial collaborators and advisors who have been indispensable in keeping the
project alive.
3. Here I use “scientific” in the sense of the German term “wissenschaftlich”, a term
which is to be applied to any work concerned with the search for truth, including the
work of historians, economists, and so on, and not just to works in the natural
sciences.
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drawer, either deliberately so or, in some cases, necessarily so, perhaps because
a paper was rejected by a journal, or a book proposal turned down by a
publisher or only partially finished, or where it is a question of work overtaken
by subsequent scientific developments. These differences must be born in mind
when embarking on an editorial project, particularly one that overrides the
intentions of the author or the publishing practices of his time. In other words,
there must be particular reasons to ignore these intentions and practices. I
will come back to this point shortly, because in Hilbert’s case there certainly
are such particular reasons, or at least we maintain that there are such.
The second point touches on the distinction between the two notions “goal
in itself” and “means to an end”. This distinction is, of course, not an absolute
one, but depends, among other contextual factors, on the perspectives adopted
by the editors of theNachlaß in question. This is a crucial point, and one which
deserves to be underlined. A means to an end can become a goal in itself and
vice versa, depending on the interests of the editors, the intended readership,
the epoch in which the edition is published, and so on. Take for example a
historian of science. Almost by the demands of his profession, he is inclined
to regard the publication of the Nachlaß of a scientific author as a goal in
itself. On the other hand, before considering the publication of a Nachlaß,
the philosopher of science, whose primary interest is in the progress of science,
will always ask whether the author has contributed in a significant way to
discoveries or in some way to the understanding or clarification of the science in
question. If the answer here is clearly negative, then the consideration of that
figure will be abandoned or postponed in favour of others who did contribute
to the field in question. On the other hand, if the answer is positive, even
then there is a significant further question to be addressed, namely are there
sufficiently many important unpublished pieces in the Nachlaß to justify a
publication of a partial or full Nachlaß edition, or should just a few individual
pieces be published separately, or even dealt with piecemeal in a series of
expository articles.4
4. Tilman Sauer of the Einstein Edition has criticized my opposition of the his-
torian with the philosopher of science as somewhat “exaggerated”. This is certainly
true; for the sake of clarity, I have somewhat overdrawn the opposition, though, I
contend, not by too much. My real view can be summarized briefly as follows. The
historian of science must certainly take into account constraints such as the literary
quality of a scientific author, his reputation as a scientist, the originality of his ideas,
and so on. In this sense, then, the edition of a Nachlaß will never be a “goal in itself”,
even for the historian of science. Nevertheless, the historian is more inclined than
the philosopher of science to investigate authors whose contributions do not lie on
the main highway of scientific progress, but rather on a minor road, or even at times
on a dead-end street. The philosopher of science, on the other hand, is primarily
interested in those authors who have contributed significantly to the actual progress
of science and our understanding of nature. Having said this, though, it is not always
clear which road represents the main stream, and for this reason the philosopher
sometimes might also have to consider authors who pursued by-ways. This can give
144 Ulrich Majer
The opposition between these points of view is, of course, not a strict one,
and is presented here only as a way of pointing to some of the complexities. In
many cases, it is a matter of taste and experience whether an author is judged
as interesting, or as rather pedestrian and of lesser significance. It often enough
transpires subsequently that a previous judgment was quite inappropriate, and
that the author in question was either over- or underestimated. In spite of
such errors, and other imponderables, it is very important to be clear about
the goals that one wants to achieve with the edition of a scientific Nachlaß
before embarking on the task. This cannot be stated too strongly, and brings
us back to the main question, namely what was the goal behind the decision
to publish the Hilbert Edition, and why only a part of the Hilbert Nachlaß,
and why this part and not another?
Unfortunately, this simple question cannot be answered directly because
the answer is, in a certain sense, context dependent, and this dependence
must first be outlined in order to make the answer intelligible. The context
has several dimensions: there were several different circumstances which, taken
together, influenced the Editors, and which were behind the decision to pub-
lish only a certain part of Hilbert’s Nachlaß. These circumstances were: (1)
the time at which the publication was being considered by the initiators of the
project; (2) the possible sources of organizational and of financial support; (3)
the different education and professional interests of the Editors; (4) the ques-
tion of the possible readership, and (5) lastly, the interdisciplinary dimension
of Hilbert’s work. Of course, not all these circumstances had the same weight,
and I will sketch only the three most important ones and their interrelations.
Let me begin with the time factor.
The idea of publishing part of Hilbert’s Nachlaß was conceived by myself,
Michael Hallett and William Ewald, all rather independently, in the second
part of the 1980s. We each realized that there was a wealth of interesting
and potentially important unpublished material in Hilbert’s Nachlaß, which
deserved consideration by the broader scientific community. The loose ideas
then received more concrete form in discussions and plans between Hallett and
myself in 1991. This period of deliberation is notable, because Hilbert’s fame
as a leading mathematician, one who had “impressed the seal of his spirit”
on the mathematics of the twentieth century, had “sunken below the horizon”
(to use a formulation of Hermann Weyl [Weyl 1944]), while at the same time
a new interest in Hilbert as a truly universal scientist had begun to glimmer
as a new dawn. More detail surrounding this complex situation will follow
later; for the time being, it suffices to keep in mind the change of Hilbert’s
reputation as being similar to a sunset at the polar circle.
Certainly, the most important circumstance regarding the edition of
Hilbert’s Nachlaß was the fact that the Editors initiating the project are by
profession philosophers and not, as one might perhaps expect, mathemati-
birth to editions of material by secondary authors. The edition of such material is
then a quasi “goal in itself”.
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cians or historians of science proper. This was not only crucial for the de-
cision to publish only a part of Hilbert’s Nachlaß, namely his writings on
the foundations of mathematics and science, and thus to ignore his writings
on pure mathematics, but it also determined the particular goals of the Edi-
tion. (See below.) The second and equally important circumstance is the
interdisciplinary character of Hilbert’s work. This important aspect is often
overlooked; it was, for the Editors, one of the main reasons for publishing
precisely that part of Hilbert’s Nachlaß which showed most vividly his simul-
taneous interest in the foundations of mathematics and physics, as well as
in the attendant philosophical questions. In fact, in our view, Hilbert reveals
himself in the Nachlaß as an important philosopher as well as a scientist and an
outstanding mathematician.
Let me now address some important features of the intellectual background
of the 1990s and outline the more specific reasons, which made it important,
at least from a philosophical point of view, to edit a considerable selection of
Hilbert’s Nachlaß.
There are two central points, which have to be outlined. The first touches
on a rather general aspect of philosophy towards the end of the twentieth
century; the second concerns a specific difficulty in orthodox philosophy
of science following the appearance of Kuhn’s work The Structure of
Scientiﬁc Revolutions.
“Analytical philosophy” in the tradition of Frege, Russell, Carnap, and
Quine was the dominant school in the second half of the twentieth century.
Those who distrusted either the empiricist or the logicist dogmas of this school
of philosophy were in the typical position of a scientific minority. Here is not
the place to go into all the reasons for distrust; but the most important and
serious difficulty was that there seemed to be no reasonable and feasible alter-
native to Frege’s and Russell’s views on the philosophy of language in general,
and the philosophy of logic and mathematics in particular grounded as these
are in “truth-value semantics”. This is not to say that there were no alternative
foundations around. There were too many, in fact; but most of these were fab-
rications by philosophers and had little to do with the practice of mathematics
and almost no contact with the real sciences. In this situation, it seemed to
us utterly desirable to highlight one of the “genuine” alternatives, one, which
had withstood the tests of science, and which also stood in close contact with
the practice of modern mathematics. This was Hilbert’s conception of a “Be-
weistheorie”, which aimed at a “New Foundation of Mathematics”.5
There are two serious objections, which arise at this point. First, wasn’t
this program already well known from Hilbert’s own publications? Second, and
more importantly, wasn’t the program a complete failure in the light of Gödel’s
famous proof that there can be no “finitist” proof of the consistency even of
5. This is a translation of the German expression “Neubegründung der Mathe-
matik”, which was used as the title of the essay in which Hilbert informed the mathe-
matical world for the first time of his program for a new foundation of mathematics.
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Peano arithmetic? Before addressing these questions, it should be stressed that
elucidating Hilbert’s program alone, no matter how successful, would itself not
be a sufficient reason to publish a significant part of Hilbert’s Nachlaß. More
delicate questions had to be taken into account, questions which centre on the
relationship between the work in the Nachlaß and the already published work.
For example, did Hilbert not have sufficient opportunity to promote his new
proof theory? This would seem highly unlikely, given his preeminence and in-
fluence. Was his “formalist” point of view misconceived, at least in the eyes of
the philosophers, or only misunderstood? Was his “finitist point of view [finite
Einstellung]” of a combined foundation for logic and mathematics in fact an
untenable position, or did his contemporaries only misconstrue it? Are there
genuinely significant differences between the way matters are presented in the
Nachlaß, and are these differences enough to justify a publication of material
from the latter? Would this suffice to correct the most important misunder-
standings? And lastly, but by no means least, is there a genuine chance of a
reassessment of Hilbert’s work and his program, or did developments after the
nineteen thirties leave Hilbert’s work hopelessly behind?
The extensive Hilbert Edition is well underway [Hilbert 2004a], and from
this fact, it is easy to imagine what were concluded as answers to these del-
icate questions. Nonetheless, let me stress one principal consideration, which
was highly important in influencing the decision to pursue an Edition. If the
Editors had not been convinced that most of the misgivings about Hilbert’s
program rested on a set of misunderstandings, most of them crude, although
some subtle, our decision would have been different. Only the firm conviction
that there are genuine misunderstandings of Hilbert’s work and that the publi-
cation of a considerable part of the Nachlaß offered a real chance of correcting
these misunderstandings tipped the balance in favour of an edition. Now, let
me turn to the second, more specifically philosophical consideration.
Orthodox philosophy of science with its standard view of the progress of
science as a cumulative enterprise had its beginnings in the nineteen twenties,
when Schlick, Carnap, and Neurath founded the Vienna Circle, and Reichen-
bach started a similar group in Berlin. Whatever the internal differences, their
common goal can be summed up in the slogan “The Overcoming of Metaphysics
by Logical Analysis of Language”,6 or more specifically, the logical analysis of
scientific languages and theories. This compelling program never really got off
the ground, but turned into a debate about different methodological princi-
ples and antithetical methodologies that finally collapsed under the assault of
Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientiﬁc Revolutions. Following this, concepts like
“meaning-change”, “incommensurability of theories” and “shift of paradigms”
through scientific revolutions became the new slogans of philosophy of science.
But what if one retained sympathy with some of the goals of the old approach,
6. This is the translation of the German “Die Überwindung der Metaphysik durch
logische Analyse der Sprache”, which was the title of a programmatic essay by Rudolf
Carnap [Carnap 1931].
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or with the principle of rational continuity of the Vienna Circle, given that the
program of the Circle as originally conceived is not viable? This is where
Hilbert again becomes of central importance, since his Nachlaß contains many
lectures (both individual lectures and lecture courses), which provide a logical
analysis of physical theories of the highest quality, comparable only with the
axiomatic presentation of geometry and its logical analysis given in Hilbert’s
own book Foundations of Geometry of 1899 and later. Indeed, these very
different works of Hilbert have much in common; they are tied together by
the same methodical procedure, the procedure that Hilbert called the “ax-
iomatic method”. To make these lectures public is the second main reason for
publishing Hilbert’s Nachlaß.
This seems to be the right place to enumerate what the Nachlaß contains;
after this I will discuss briefly why we believe that we can achieve our goals.
As already mentioned in the abstract, there exist two important collections
of Hilbert documents in Göttingen which together we referred to as Hilbert’s
Nachlaß : a collection of lecture notes (the majority of them typescripts) held in
the library of the Mathematical Institute (MI), and then a much more diverse
and inhomogeneous set of papers and documents held in the Niedersächsische
Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek (SUB). The latter could be called Hilbert’s
Nachlaß in the proper sense, because it contains all the extant autographs,
some of Hilbert’s own copies of lecture notes prepared for, or from, his lectures,
and many other kinds of documents written in Hilbert’s hand (e.g., complete
lectures delivered to scholarly societies, or to mathematical or philosophical
seminars, or fragments and sketches of such), and additionally a great number
of letters to Hilbert. There is some overlap between the two collections, since
some of the lecture notes in the MI (but by no means all) are also present
in the SUB; where there are duplicates, we have relied in most cases on the
copies from the SUB, since these contain usually more substantial annotations
in Hilbert’s hand; where there is no duplication we have, of course, chosen the
manuscripts or typescripts from the MI.
There is another, presumably rather uncommon, characteristic of Hilbert’s
Nachlaß, which must be mentioned. The Nachlaß contains in all more than
120 distinct sets of lecture notes, most of them well worked out (with the
exception of some of Hilbert’s early autographs) either by Hilbert himself or
by one of his assistants, or sometimes by an advanced student. Indeed, it is
no exaggeration to say that these lecture notes make up the main bulk of the
significant material in Hilbert’s Nachlaß. The content of these lecture notes
ranges from topics in pure mathematics (e.g., number theory, function theory,
etc.), geometry, logic and arithmetic (including proof theory), and furthermore
many different branches of classical and modern physics (mechanics, electrody-
namics, thermodynamics and statistics, relativity and quantum theory), and
in addition some more popular lectures on philosophical questions and prob-
lems concerning mathematics and the natural sciences. Given the enormous
extent of all this material we had to make a selection, and we decided from
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the very beginning that we would only publish works on the foundations of
mathematics and physics. This meant three things:
(i) we had to ignore all the purely mathematical writings (which form, of
course, the bulk of Hilbert’s Nachlaß);
(ii) we decided not to edit the correspondence, although we make use of it
in the annotations, not least because we possess very little of Hilbert’s
side of the exchanges;
(iii) we decided to omit all private and/or administrative material, even
though some of this is very interesting, e.g., the material concerning
Brouwer, or that concerning Husserl, Nelson, etc.
These decisions were, of course, not sufficient by themselves to narrow
down the material to a wise and useful selection; further criteria had to be
brought to bear. The main problem to be solved is encapsulated in the ques-
tions: What counts as “foundational”? And which works count as a contribu-
tion to the foundations of a discipline and which do not? There is, of course,
no sharp answer to these questions, and they had to be dealt with differently
with respect to the different fields. In geometry, the issue is relatively easy,
because in this area, since Euclid, we have had an intimate relation between
foundational study and the axiomatic approach.7 The distinction is already
more difficult in the area of pure mathematics because here there is no general
agreement as to which theory is fundamental, for example, logic, algebra, set
theory or elementary arithmetic. And Hilbert actually occupied himself rather
intensively with this question, certainly up until 1920. Consequently, we han-
dled the “criteria of choice” here in a rather liberal way, and have included be-
side lecture courses in logic (and “logical principles of mathematical thought”),
arithmetic and proof theory, courses covering set theory, as well as more gen-
eral series such as the ones focusing on the “Quadratur des Kreises” and related
topics. Moreover, it is important to realize that Hilbert himself changed the
nature of “foundational” investigation so that this included the logical analysis
of central (i.e., fundamental) theories. Important in this is Hilbert’s concep-
tion of the “axiomatic method”, first expounded and wonderfully exploited, in
his work on geometry in the 1890s. This new kind of foundational investiga-
tion was pursued, not just with respect to geometry, analysis, set theory and
other central areas of mathematics, but also with respect to physics. This is
the most problematic area, since the growth and development of physics in
the first half of the twentieth century was so rapid, and consequently no sharp
distinction can be drawn between the most advanced research fields and the
7. Let me stress that this is not meant to suggest that progress in geometry can
only be achieved via an axiomatic approach; on the contrary, progress in geometry
has come in many different and quite unexpected ways. Rather, it means that the
search for, and analysis of, the “fundamental” principles is most properly served by
the axiomatic approach.
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question of the “foundations” of the various disciplines.8 For this reason, the
distinction between pure and foundational research was in effect ignored and
we selected those lectures that, with the wisdom of hindsight, appeared the
most progressive and epistemologically interesting.
Quite apart from the general issue of finding reasonable selection crite-
ria, there were special, local problems; I will only mention two of them here.
Sometimes the Nachlaß contains more than one exemplar of notes of lectures
prepared from the very same series by two people apparently working indepen-
dently. One striking example is the lecture series from 1905 entitled “Logische
Principien des mathematischen Denkens”, for which there are two different
scripts, one prepared by Max Born and the other by Hilbert’s assistant Ernst
Hellinger. This raises the question as to which of the two sets of notes were to
be selected for inclusion in the Edition. In this case, the decision was taken to
include the Hellinger’s script and not Born’s, since the Hellinger was clearly
in Hilbert’s possession, and later in the MI’s, whereas Born’s script was first
added to the Hilbert Nachlaß long after Hilbert’s death, there being also no
evidence that Hilbert was aware of its existence. Moreover, Hellinger’s script
is slightly more extensive than Born’s, although they do not disagree radically
in content. Note, though, that the Born’s script is to be referred to in the
editorial apparatus whenever it deviates from Hellinger’s in a significant way.
The second problem is more delicate. Frequently, Hilbert annotated a set
of lecture notes twice and sometimes even three times. When the changes
involve only relatively minor alterations and corrections, this poses no great
problem. But often the changes are quite extensive in the sense that they
imply a conceptual reconstruction of certain sections or chapters, or even of
the whole tenor of the lectures. This means that there is not one but sev-
eral layers of text and, hence, the question arises as to which layer is to be
given priority: the first, the last, or all of them? (There is, of course, also
a further delicate question about the determination of the “layer” to which a
particular annotation belongs, but we will leave this aside here.) This problem
becomes particularly pressing if the first (i.e., the original) layer is written in
Hilbert’s own hand, because in these cases it is often extremely difficult to de-
cide whether an annotation properly belongs to the original exposition, or is
a later addition. Frequently the question can only be answered conjecturally,
and even then, only by recourse to the respective contents, which, of course,
involves a certain methodological circularity.
Let me return to our particular goals in the different fields of Hilbert’s
foundational work, and explain what the main point of view is, and why we
are convinced that the goals are attainable, certainly in the long run. We begin
with geometry and with the prima facie simple question as to what Hilbert’s
new axiomatic approach to geometry, the so-called “axiomatic method”, is.
8. Indeed, Hilbert’s best known contributions to the initial development of general
relativity was entitled “Die Grundlagen der Physik” (Erste und Zweite Mitteilung).
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Following Hilbert’s epoch-making book The Foundations of Geometry (first
published in 1899 as a Festschrift to celebrate the unveiling of a monument
in commemorating Weber’s and Gauss’s work on the electric telegraph), the
logical positivists propounded a view of Hilbert’s new axiomatic method, a
view which is at best a caricature of Hilbert’s own. This is not the place to
recapitulate the position presented by the positivists, but it is important to
stress one point. The positivists saw a sharp contrast between Hilbert’s “new”
axiomatic approach and Euclid’s “old” axiomatic procedure, a view that was
definitely not Hilbert’s. On the contrary, he saw his own approach as a con-
tinuation and an improvement of Euclid’s way of proceeding in the Elements.
And this leads to the decisive point regarding the material on geometry from
Hilbert’s Nachlaß which the Edition has published [Hilbert 2004b]: If you con-
sult only Hilbert’s published work in geometry, i.e., the Festschrift and four
or five essays, then it is not possible to see immediately that, and why, the
“caricature” given by the logical empiricists is not Hilbert’s own view. But this
recognition is fairly clear once all the lecture courses and lecture notes leading
up to the publication of the Festschrift are taken together. With these one
can see how Hilbert developed his axiomatic method step by step, until he
could show, by means of this method, the logical independence of every axiom
of his system of Euclidean geometry and finally the system’s “completeness”,
as Hilbert called the categoricity of Euclidean geometry. Important here, too,
is the way Hilbert analyzed the logical role of many of the central elementary
propositions of the Euclidean system, often adding to this a refined analysis
of the geometrical “intuition” behind both these propositions and their proofs.
We believe that the reception and understanding of Hilbert’s work on geome-
try will be substantially altered in the desired direction by the publication of
this work on geometry.
Another field about which we aim to correct views concerns Hilbert’s al-
leged formalist position in the foundations of mathematics. Three positions
are usually distinguished in the philosophical debate about the epistemologi-
cal foundations of mathematics, the Logicism of Frege and Russell, Brouwer’s
Intuitionism, and Hilbert’s Formalism. As the last “-ism” indicates, Hilbert is
usually regarded as the father of the modern formalistic school in the founda-
tions of mathematics that stands in strong opposition to Logicism and Intu-
itionism. Here again we encounter a certain misunderstanding, but this time
a subtler one, because Hilbert indeed criticized both alternative approaches.
But from this it does not follow that Hilbert himself was a “formalist”, at
least not in the way in which his opponents tried to characterize his position.
Unfortunately, Hilbert himself fostered this misunderstanding by occasional
remarks in his published papers, in which he tried to explain the idea behind
his new proof theory, namely the elimination of all questions of meaning by a
complete “transformation” of the semantic dimension of a mathematical the-
ory and its language into a set of well-defined syntactical rules. But once the
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relevant lecture notes from the Nachlaß are published,9 it will be recognized
quite clearly that Hilbert’s idea of a proof theory has nothing to do with the
kind of mindless formalism that his critics allege against his “New Foundations
of Mathematics”, this quite aside from the matter of whether this program was
successful or not.
Finally, the third area which we hope will be illuminated by the publication
of part of the Nachlaß is the vast area of the foundations of natural science,
or more properly speaking, the different fields of physics and their respective
foundations. Here, it is not so much that Hilbert’s contributions are misunder-
stood, but more that they are not known. The first reason for this is Hilbert’s
own restrictive policy concerning publications in physics, and the second rea-
son is to be found in an undeniable antipathy on the part of some physicists
against Hilbert, who was seen as a pure mathematician, merely demonstrating
his abilities in the playground of physics.10 Hilbert published just a handful of
papers in physics (if we count only the original papers and not their reissues),
and this moreover well into the second half of his research career. From the
Nachlaß, however, we know that he gave his first lecture in physics (actually on
classical mechanics) as early as 1898, and from that time continued to lecture
on physical subjects almost every semester, covering all the principal branches
of modern physics, including classical mechanics, thermodynamics, statistical
mechanics, electrodynamics, the general theory of relativity and modern quan-
tum theory.11 This wealth of material has meant that we have had to make
a serious selection, a selection which we hope will nevertheless lift the veil of
ignorance surrounding Hilbert’s contributions to, and logical clarifications of,
the foundations of physics. This material has been put together in Volumes 4
and 5 of the Edition; the latter has recently been published as David Hilbert’s
Lectures on the Foundations of Physics, 1915-1927 [Hilbert 2009].
References
Carnap, Rudolf
1931 Die Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache,
Erkenntnis, 2, 219–242.
9. All these lectures are contained in Volume 3 of the Hilbert Edition; this will
appear in early 2010.
10. In 1922, Blumenthal referred to Hilbert’s “paradox”: “Physics is far too difficult
for the physicist”, meaning above all that foundational analysis is too difficult.
11. For a complete list of all lecture courses Hilbert held throughout his career at
both Königsberg and Göttingen, see “Hilbert Lecture Courses 1886-1934”, in either
Volume 1 or Volume 5 of the Hilbert Edition. This list will be published in each of
the forthcoming volumes.
152
Hilbert, David
2004a David Hilbert’s Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics and
Physics, 1891-1933, William Ewald, Michael Hallett, Ulrich Majer &
Wilfried Sieg (eds.), Vol. 1-6, Berlin: Springer.
2004b David Hilbert’s Lectures on the Foundations of Geometry, 1891-
1902, Michael Hallett & Ulrich Majer (eds.), Vol. 1 of Hilbert’s Lectures,
Berlin: Springer.
2009 David Hilbert’s Lectures on the Foundations of Physics, 1915-1927:
Relativity, Quantum Theory and Epistemology, Tilman Sauer & Ulrich
Majer (eds.), Vol. 5 of Hilbert’s Lectures, Berlin: Springer.
Weyl, Hermann
1944 David Hilbert and his mathematical work, Bulletin of the American
Mathematical Society, 50, 612–654.
